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ABSTRACT
This research compares differences between customers´ and suppliers´ perceptions of the
trustworthiness of their supply chain exchange partners and the implications for performance,
applying  the  organizational  behavior  and  marketing  literature  on  trust  to  the  supply  chain
context. A survey in the logistics sector in Brazil was used to collect data from two independent
samples  (customers  and  suppliers).  Three  alternative  models  of  the  antecedents  of
trustworthiness perceptions and the relationship between trust and performance were tested using
multiple  regression.  This  was followed by a  panel  session with  logistics  industry experts  to
discuss the results  and their  practical implications.  We found that the ability of an exchange
partner is important to both suppliers and customers in their perceptions of trustworthiness. In
addition, customer integrity is important to suppliers, while supplier benevolence is important to
customers.  Trust  is  related  to  expectations  about  order  accuracy,  quality  and  cost  by  both
suppliers and customers and to suppliers’ on-time delivery expectations. The findings support the
contention of social exchange theory that, when there is a trusting relationship between exchange
partners, there is heightened commitment to jointly held goals. They also support transaction cost
economics  theory  by  showing  how trust  forms  an  intangible  transaction-  specific  asset  that
serves as a governance mechanism against opportunistic behavior. The findings provide a useful
guideline for managers seeking to improve trust in their supply chain relationships. This paper
extends  interorganizational  trust  models  showing  that  the  relationship  between  trust  and
performance may not be applicable to customers and suppliers in the same manner.
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INTRODUCTION
The effective management of customer-supplier relationships is central to the success of
supply  chain  management.  Evaluating  customer  and  supplier  perceptions  of  trust  in  their
relationships  with each other  can highlight  problem areas  and opportunities  for performance
improvement (Whipple & Frankel, 2000). While much of the prior research on supply chain trust
has focused on its relationship to performance (Corsten, Gruen & Peyinghaus, 2011; Dyer, 1997;
Villena,  Rebilla  &  Choi,  2011),  other  questions  remain  to  be  resolved.  For  example,  do
customers evaluate whether they can trust a supplier based on the same criteria used by suppliers
in assessing their trust of customers? Are customers’ trust of suppliers and suppliers’ trust of
customers  equally  important  to  supply  chain  performance?  Through  developing  a  better
understanding of these potential differences, managers will be better prepared to take steps to
improve their organization’s trustworthiness in the eyes of its customers and suppliers.
In  addition,  much  of  the  prior  supply  chain  trust  research  has  been  monadic,  from  the
perspective of either customers or suppliers (Golicic, 2007) However, by its very nature, trust is a
dyadic construct, involving both the trustor and the trustee. Thus, while helping to articulate key
constructs, much of the prior supply chain trust research is prone to respondent bias because it uses a
single source to assess a dyadic construct (Flynn, Pagell & Fugate, 2018), implicitly assuming that
both parties in a relationship would assess its level of trust in the same way. Ketchen et al. (2018)
liken this to a marriage counselor asking only one spouse about the quality of a marriage. We seek to
add to this literature by studying customers’ and suppliers’ independent perceptions of supply chain
trust, in order to help understand differences in their perceptions. We seek to answer these questions
by applying three alternative models of interpersonal trust to the context of a supply chain, studying
the perceptions of both customers and suppliers. In doing so, we highlight the
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trustworthiness of the parties in a relationship, which is antecedent to the development of trust.
This  has important  implications  for managers  seeking to  improve trust  in their  supply chain
relationships.
We begin by establishing a theoretical background for the positive effects of trust, based on
social exchange theory and the negative effects of a non-trusting relationship, based on transaction
cost economics theory. These concepts are used to develop hypotheses about critical dimensions of
trustworthiness, their relationship to supply chain trust and the relationship between supply chain
trust and performance. Hypotheses are tested using data from a survey of customers and suppliers of
logistics services in Brazil. The findings make important contributions to the literature on supply
chain trust, as well as to managers of firms involved in supply chain relationships.
TRUST IN A SUPPLY CHAIN
The  supply  chain  environment  is  comprised  of  complex,  tightly  coupled  interfirm
networks shaped by often intense global competition (Bode, et al., 2011). While subjective, trust
is central in explaining supply chain relationships (Morgan & Hunt 1994). Establishment of trust
can be challenging in a supply chain, however, because a trustor may have to make decisions
about a relationship prior understanding whether or not the trustee will actually fill its promises
(Kee & Knox, 1970; Bode, et al.,  2011). The trustor may need to conduct exchanges with a
supplier or customer with which it has no prior experience,  thus, it  may lack an experiential
foundation for assessing whether a supplier will  deliver items of the promised quality at the
promised time or a customer should be extended credit. Yet, because of the inextricable linkages
between firms in a supply chain (Flynn, et al., 2016), the trustor will need to rely on a trustee to
perform important functions for it (Bode, et al., 2011).
Theoretical Foundations
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The theoretical foundations of supply chain trust are provided by social exchange theory (SET)
and transaction cost economics theory (TCE).  SET describes business relationships as inherently
interwoven with personal relationships (Zaheer & Venkatraman, 1995). This is relevant to supply
chains because supply chain relationships are established between individuals,  on behalf of their
firms. Although contractual relationships are between firms, personal relationships often guide the
selection of the firms that are parties to a contract. When there is a committed, trusting relationship
between them,  both  are  more  strongly tied  to  jointly  established  goals  (Chen & Paulraj,  2004),
according to SET. For example, a customer will treat a trusted supplier like a team member, rather
than  an  anonymous transactional  exchange partner. As  the  duration  and intensity  of  interactions
between supply chain exchange partners increases, their bonds of attraction lead to development of
embedded relationships that generate trust, causing behavioral expectations about the relationship
(Ambrose, Marshall & Lynch, 2010; Granovetter, 1985). When transactions are embedded within a
reciprocal social relationship like trust, social sanctions can function as governance mechanisms that
protect the interests of customers and suppliers  (Dyer & Chu,  2000).  Thus, SET focuses on the
positive outcomes of the normative relationship commitment (Morgan & Hunt, 1994; Wetzels, et al.,
1998) that results from trust between firms.
TCE, on the other hand, focuses on avoiding the negative consequences of a non-trusting
relationship, which is also important in supply chains. For example, when a supplier is required
to invest in a transaction-specific asset such as a machine that can’t be deployed for use with
other customers, the customer may engage in opportunistic behavior, such a reducing the price
that it pays or dealing with the supplier’s competitors in an attempt to extract concessions. Thus,
investments  in  transaction-specific  assets  create  a  transaction  cost  imbalance,  which  will  be
opportunistically exploited (Dyer, 1977; Poppo & Zenger, 2002: Zaheer &Venkatraman, 1995).
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In  order  to  prevent  such  hazards,  trustees  employ  safeguarding  mechanisms,  such  as  legal
contracts that can be costly to monitor compliance with.
Trust can function as an alternative safeguarding mechanism against exchange hazards,
leading to reduced transactions costs (Corsten, et al., 2011; Poppo & Zenger, 2002; Zaheer &
Venkatraman, 1995). The mutual expectations and understandings associated with trust serve as
an intangible transaction-specific asset that can reduce the likelihood of opportunistic behavior,
because its development requires a substantial amount of time (Weiss & Kurland, 1997) for both
firms  to  learn  the  nuances  of  dealing  with  the  other’s requirements.  The resulting  modified
procedures become embedded in employees and day-to-day routines (Simon, 1996; Zack, 1999),
making them difficult  to  directly  observe  (Nielson,  1996),  in  order  to  be exploited.  Further,
because the trustee must engage in frequent communication with the trustor to understand its
needs  (Subramani  &  Venkatraman,  2003),  the  trustor  has  a  better  basis  for  monitoring  the
trustee’s activities,  making  it  more  difficult  for  the  trustee  to  take  advantage  of  it.  Finally,
because both the trustor and trustee must invest time into developing a trusting relationship, there
are also transaction costs for the trustee associated with terminating the relationship, leading to
reduced opportunistic behavior.
Definition of Trust
The roots of supply chain trust lie in literature on interpersonal trust (Farris,  et al.,  1973;
Boss,  1978)  and  interorganizational  trust  (Moorman,  1993;  Gulati,  1995).  We draw  upon  these
foundations to develop a clear definition of trust between a customer and a supplier in a supply chain
and its dimensions, using both the customer and supplier as the referent. Like the individual-level
trust research in the organizational behavior literature, supply chain relationships have a strong non-
economic component. However, because commercial relationships between firms are
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inherently interwoven with personal relationships between individuals in purchasing and sales 
functions of the firms (Zaheer & Venkatraman, 1995), both perspectives are relevant.
In general, trust is a poorly understood construct, akin to Supreme Court Justice Potter 
Stewart’s description of pornography:
I shall not today attempt further to define the kinds of material I understand to be
embraced within that shorthand description, and perhaps I could never succeed in
intelligibly doing so. But I know it when I see it (Lattman, 2007).
Like pornography, people believe that they know trust when they see it, even though it may be
difficult to articulate exactly what constitutes it. Thus, “trust” is a type of shorthand description
with  numerous  connotations,  some  of  which  are  conflicting.  For  example,  the  sociological
perspective describes trust as a characteristic of the “social fabric” that facilitates interactions
between firms (Lewis & Weigert, 1985), positioning trust as a characteristic of a relationship.
The legalistic perspective focuses on control mechanisms and contractual provisions that protect
a  trustor  from  trustees’  opportunistic  behavior  (Colquitt,  Scott  &  LePine,  2007).  The
psychological perspective views trust as an individual personality characteristic; it is a trustor’s
generalized  expectation  that  trustees’  promises  can  be  relied  upon  (Rotter,  1967).  These
perspectives  provide an insufficient  foundation  for  the study of trust  in  a supply chain.  The
sociological perspective, while describing relationships, doesn’t provide a means for a trustee to
establish itself  as trustworthy (Mayer  & Davis, 1999). The legalistic perspective can actually
encourage  opportunistic  behavior  by  trustees  in  longer  term  relationships  (Mayer,  Davis  &
Schoorman,  1995), since a trustor’s monitoring of the trustee or defensive behaviors may be
interpreted by trustees as a sign of distrust (McAllister, 1995). The psychological perspective of
trust propensity as an individual characteristic is important in understanding a specific trustor,
but ignores the shared exchanges between firms over time (Lewis & Weigert, 1985).
6
The supply chain literature is rife with definitions of trust, and supply chain trust has been
operationalized in numerous ways (Delbufalo, 2012: Seppännen, et al., 2007; Whipple, et al.,
2013), illustrated in Table 1. Although there are multiple dimensions, there is little agreement on
what they are.  Different terms have been used to describe the same dimension; for instance,
“credibility,” “ability” and “competence” have all been used to describe the extent to which a
supplier has the required expertise to perform a job (Ganesan, 1994; Komiak & Benbasat, 2004),
but “credibility” is also used synonymously with “honesty.” “Integrity” has been used to describe
both the belief that a trustee tells the truth (Komiak & Benbasat, 2004), as well as a trustee’s
consistency of actions (Bode, Wagner, Petersen & Ellram, 2011). Thus, there is a need for a clear,
parsimonious definition of supply chain trust and its dimensions.
Insert Table 1 About Here
We build on the seminal work of Mayer, et al. (1995), who define trust as  a trustor’s
willingness to be vulnerable to a trustee’s actions. This applies well in a supply chain, where a
trustor, such as Mattel or a JIT manufacturer, is vulnerable to suppliers’ actions, such as the use
of lead paint to decorate toys or suppliers’ promises of on-time delivery. Thus, trust is:
The willingness of a firm to be vulnerable to the actions of another firm, based on
the expectation that the other will perform a particular action that is important to
the trustor, irrespective of [its] ability to monitor or control the other firm (Mayer,
et al., 1995, p. 112).
There are several key aspects of this definition. It is based on the trustor’s expectation that a
trustee will  provide what is  expected (Mc Allister, 1995) (safe  toys or components delivered on
time), rather than what is feared (toys with safety hazards or late deliveries). A trustor’s expectations
are its perceptions, beliefs or confidence about a relationship (Anderson & Narus, 1990; Doney &
Canon, 1997; Ganesan, 1994; Swan & Nolan, 1985), based on prior experiences with the trustee, the
trustee’s reputation, recommendations by others, the trustor’s trust propensity,
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contractual arrangements and a host of other dimensions (Mayer, et al., 1995). These expectations are
continuously adjusted; positive outcomes lead to fulfillment of the trustor’s expectations, enabling
trust,  while  negative  outcomes  relative  to  expectations  lead  to  reduced  trust  and  the  need  for
safeguards (Blau, 1965; Deutsch, 1958; Noorderhaven, 1992; Swan & Nolan, 1985).
Vulnerability  implies that there is something important to the trustor at stake (Mayer, et
al., 1995), such as revenue, ability to meet delivery obligations or reputation for providing safe
products. Vulnerability arises when a trustor’s scarce resources cause it to depend on a trustee to
provide resources and activities (Bode, et al.,  2011). Trust has an affective component,  since
actual supply chain risk can arise from many dimensions unrelated to a trustor’s willingness to
take a risk,  such as weather, political  climate,  competitive factors,  infrastructural  factors and
economic stability.
Trustworthiness
Constructs like vulnerability, expectations and risk can be difficult to operationalize, making
trust a somewhat amorphous construct. Thus, the focus of this research is on the antecedents to trust
in a supply chain relationship, which comprise what is known as trustworthiness. Trustworthiness is a
relationship-specific characteristic of a trustee (Mayer, et al., 1995). It is the trustor’s expectation that
a trustee will perform a particular action (Colquitt et al.,
2007). It is specific to a relationship between two firms; a specific trustor expects that a specific
trustee will deliver on its promises. Trustworthiness is thus also related to a specific expected
action (Mayer, et al., 1995), such as on-time delivery, production to specifications, adherence to
health and safety requirements, making payments as promised or providing clear specifications.
Thus, trustworthiness is not the same as trust towards a specific trustee or an individual’s trust
propensity (Colquitt, et al., 2007), rather, it is an antecedent to trust. This has important
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implications  for  supply  chain  members  since,  by  understanding  the  dimensions  of  its  own
trustworthiness, a customer or supplier can nurture trust by current or potential trustors. Thus, while
trust, itself, may be a somewhat amorphous construct that can be difficult to understand, developing a
better understanding of the critical dimensions of trustworthiness in a supply chain can guide a firm
towards specific actions that it can take to improve the perceptions of its trustors.
Mayer  et  al.’s (1995) seminal  research  proposes  three  dimensions  of trustworthiness  that
encompass many, diverse dimensions, yet vary independently. Accordingly, we build on this research
to propose three  dimensions of trustworthiness  that  provide  a  foundation  for  supply chain  trust:
trustees’ ability,  benevolence  and  integrity.  Each  contributes  a  unique  perspective  of  a  trustor’s
perception of a trustee’s trustworthiness in a given situation. These three dimensions are interrelated,
but  separable (Mayer,  et  al.,  1999).  For example,  if  a  supplier  has superb technical  skills  (high
ability), but routinely engages in opportunistic behavior through its pricing or sharing the customer’s
proprietary  information  with  its  competitors  (low benevolence),  the  customer  will  not  trust  the
supplier,  manifest  by its  low willingness  to  continue to  make itself  vulnerable  to  the  suppliers’
opportunistic behavior, should alternative suppliers with similar ability become available. Similarly,
integrity is inextricably linked to, yet independent from, ability and benevolence. For example, if a
supplier that treats a customer well (high benevolence) and has a high level of technical capabilities
(high ability) also has a history of circumventing safety requirements (low integrity), the customer
may not be willing to continue be vulnerable to this supplier’s practices. This was the painful lesson
learned by Mattel after it subcontracted production in China to benevolent and capable suppliers that
demonstrated low integrity by further subcontracting some of their operations to contractors that
failed to adhere to Mattel’s lead paint
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standards (Lyles, 2008). The three dimensions of trustworthiness are described in a supply chain
context below and used as the foundation for developing an initial set of hypotheses.
Ability. Ability is the set of skills, competencies and characteristics that enable a trustee to
do what the trustor expects. In a supply chain, ability is a trustor’s belief that a customer or
supplier  is  knowledgeable,  reliable  and has  the  needed technical  capabilities  to  perform the
expected  task effectively (Andersen & Kumar, 2006;  Cho, 2006; Ganesan, 1994; Komiak &
Benbasat, 2004). Ability is domain-specific (Mayer, et al., 1995). For example, a supplier may
have specialized technical skills for producing a particular set of components, while it may have
little  aptitude  for  others.  Perceptions  of  ability  emerge  through  formal  transactions  or
negotiations  (Anderson  &  Weitz,  1989),  Noorderhaven,  1992;  Zaheer,  McEvily  &  Perrone,
1998),  or  they  can  develop  informally  (Mayer  &  Davis,  1999),  through  situational  norms,
behaviors or intentions (Dyer & Chu, 2000; Swan & Nolan, 1985). Thus, a trustor’s perception
of a trustee’s ability is  based on both knowledge and skills  related to a specific  job and its
interpersonal skills and general wisdom (Colquitt, et al., 2007) related to supply chain success.
Ability subsumes other related constructs including competence, expertise (Colquitt, et
al.,  2007),  business  sense,  predictability  and  judgment  (Mayer,  et  al.,  1995).  For  example,
predictability is the consistency with which the trustee meets expectations. However, because it
does not imply directionality, predictability can actually reduce trustworthiness (Mayer, et al.,
1995); for example, a supplier may predictably produce poor quality items or miss deadlines, or
a customer may consistently make late payments or provide unclear specifications. Thus, ability
is  the broader construct  based on the predictability of positive outcomes.  As a dimension of
trustworthiness, a trustor’s perception of a trustee’s ability is an antecedent to its trust. Thus,
H1: The perceived ability of a trustee is an antecedent to supply chain trust.
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A  supplier’s  ability  is  based  on  its  technical  capabilities  for  meeting  a  customer’s
specifications  and  available  capacity  to  deliver  on  time.  When  selecting  a  new  supplier,
recommendations  by  others  provide  customers  with  assurance  that  the  supplier  will  deliver
needed components in a timely manner. For existing suppliers, their past performance provides
customers assurance that they will continue to perform as expected. In this way, the supplier’s
ability provides a way of meeting the customer’s expectations, causing the customer to be willing
to make itself vulnerable to it.
H1a : The perceived ability of a supplier is an antecedent to a customer’s trust in it.
A  supplier  also  has  expectations  about  its  customers,  trusting  that  they  will  make
payments on time and accurately describe their needs. Customers’ abilities are assessed through
prior experience, knowledge of their cash flow situation, terms of contractual relationships or
reputation. When a customer is perceived to have the appropriate level of ability, the supplier is
willing to make itself vulnerable by extending credit or taking on a customer’s job.
H1b : The perceived ability of a customer is an antecedent to a supplier’s trust in it. Benevolence.
A trustee’s benevolence is the extent to which it is perceived to be genuinely
interested in the trustor’s welfare and motivated to seek joint gain (Anderson & Kumar, 2006; Doney
& Cannon, 1997; Ganesan, 1994). It is the extent to which a trustee is perceived as wanting to do
good for the trustor, beyond its own self-interest (Mayer, et al., 1995; McAllister, 1995). In a supply
chain, benevolence is manifested in a trustee’s altruistic behavior towards a customer or supplier,
demonstrating that it is acting in their best interests. Related constructs include the trustee’s caring
intentions and motives, altruism, loyalty (Mayer, et al., 1995), organizational citizenship behavior
(Organ, 1988), openness, caring, receptivity, availability (Colquitt, et al.,
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2007)  and  goodwill.  As  a  dimension  of  trustworthiness,  the  trustee’s  benevolence  is  an
antecedent to supply chain trust.
H2: The perceived benevolence of a trustee is an antecedent to supply chain trust.
A benevolent supplier may put in extraordinary effort to help a customer address a tight
deadline. In negotiations, it considers the customer’s needs, as well as its own.
H2a: The perceived benevolence of a supplier is an antecedent to a customer’s trust in it. 
Conversely, a customer may demonstrate benevolence by offering a long-term contract to
a supplier, provide it with financing for the purchase of a new piece of equipment or provide
specialized training that the supplier can leverage to other customers.
H2b : The perceived benevolence of a customer is an antecedent to a supplier’s trust in it. 
Integrity. Integrity is the trustor’s perception that a trustee adheres to a set of principles that
it  finds  acceptable  (Colquitt,  et  al.,  2007);  both  alignment  between  the  trustee’s  and  trustor’s
principles  and  the  trustee’s  adherence  to  them  are  important  (Mayer,  et  al.,  1995).  Integrity  is
established through the extent to which a trustee keeps promises, fulfills expectations and avoids
issues  that  could  cause  problems  for  a  trustor  (Blau,  1965;  Swan  &  Nolan,  1985;  Zaheer
&Venkatraman, 1995). A trustor forms perceptions of a trustee’s integrity through the consistency of
its past actions, communications about its actions (Bode, et al, 2011), its belief that the trustee has a
strong sense of justice and fairness, and the extent to which the trustee’s actions are aligned with its
promises.  Related  constructs  include  value  congruence  (Sitkin  &  Roth,  1993),  fairness  (Butler,
1991), discretion (Colquitt, et al., 2017) and character (Gabarro, 1978). They build upon the trustor’s
expectation that a trustee’s word can be relied upon, that it makes good faith agreements, fulfills its
promises (Doney & Cannon, 1997; Thomas & Skinner 2010; Tian, Lai & Daniel, 2008), presents real
facts about outsourced work, reacts proactively if something goes
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wrong and shares important information (Oza, Hall, Rainer & Grey, 2006; Svensson, 2001; Tian,
et al., 2008). As a dimension of trustworthiness, integrity is an antecedent to supply chain trust.
H3: The perceived integrity of a trustee is an antecedent to supply chain trust.
A supplier perceived to have integrity will establish a fair price for its services and will
value the same principles as its customers do. For example, a supplier that values low cost over
safety standards might not be viewed by customers as having a high level of integrity, while a
supplier that refuses to compromise its quality standards would.
H3a: The perceived integrity of a supplier is an antecedent to a customer’s trust in it. 
Customer integrity is established by actions such as demonstrating its willingness to pay
suppliers  a  fair  price  without  extended  negotiations  and  clear  articulation  of  its  values  and
principles to suppliers.
H3b : The perceived integrity of a customer is an antecedent to a supplier’s trust in it.
Figure 1 summarizes the relationships described by these hypotheses.
Insert Figure 1 About Here
Alternative Conceptualizations of Trustworthiness
We  examine  two  alternative  configurations  of  trustworthiness,  in  order  to  better
understand trust in a supply chain.
Competence-character model. Gabarro’s (1978) longitudinal research found two dimensions
of  trustworthiness.  The  first  is  competence,  which  is  conceptually  synonymous  with  ability,  as
described  above.  The second is  a  multifaceted  construct  that  Gabarro  (1978)  called  “character,”
which includes honesty, openness,  fairness,  predictability and caring motives and intentions.  The
character-competence model  is  supported  by Colquitt,  et  al.’s (2007)  argument that  it  is  unclear
whether benevolence and integrity each have a unique effect on trust. It proposes that
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benevolence and integrity have a compensatory effect, where either is sufficient for fostering
trust; the absence of one can be compensated for by the presence of the other. Thus, our first
alternative conceptualization of trustworthiness, illustrated in Figure 2, is based on competence
(the “can-do” dimension), and character (the “will-do” dimension) (Colquitt, 2007). Because the
relationship  between  competence  (ability)  and  supply  chain  trust  was  already  hypothesized
above (H1a and H1b), we only propose new hypotheses related to character as a dimension of
supply chain trustworthiness.
H4a: The perceived character of a supplier is an antecedent to a customer’s trust in it.
H4b : The perceived character of a customer is an antecedent to a supplier’s trust in it. Insert
Figure 2 About Here
Cognition-based  trust  and  affect-based  trust  model.  McAllister  (1995)  described
trustworthiness  as  related  to  the  trustor’s  knowledge  about  a  trustee.  If  a  trustor  has  full
knowledge, there is no need for trust; conversely, if a trustor is completely ignorant about the
trustee,  there  is  no  rational  basis  for  trust.  McAllister  (1995)  described  two  dimensions  of
knowledge about a trustee. Affect-based trust is grounded in the emotional bonds between a pair
of firms, the extent of genuine care and concern for the welfare of the other, belief in the intrinsic
value of the relationship and the belief that these sentiments are reciprocated by the other firm
(McAllister, 1995). Affect-based trust is demonstrated through the trustee’s citizenship behavior
toward the trustor and the frequency of their interaction. Thus, affect-based trust is equivalent to
benevolence, described above.
Cognition-based trust, which is based on the trustee’s reliability and dependability (Rempel, et
al.,  1985; Johnson-George & Swap,  1982),  is  more objective (McAllister, 1995).  Antecedents of
cognition-based  trust  include  the  success  of  past  interactions  and  the  extent  of  social  and
organizational similarity between the trustor and trustee, including formal rule specifications and
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professional  credentials.  Thus,  cognition-based  trust,  summarized  in  Figure  3,  includes  both
ability  and  integrity,  as  described  above  (Colquitt,  et  al.,  2007;  Flores  &  Solomon,  1998;
Rousseau, et al., 1998; Williams, 2001).
Insert Figure 3 About Here
A baseline of cognition-based trust is necessary before affect-based trust can develop.
Without  expectations  about  a  trustee’s dependability,  a  trustor  can’t  be  confident  in  making
attributions about the trustee’s potential citizenship behavior (the trustee must have the ability to
execute,  not  just  good intentions).  Because  we have  already proposed hypotheses  about  the
relationship between affect-based trust (benevolence) and trust above in H2a and H2b, we only
propose further hypotheses about cognition-based trust as an antecedent to supply chain trust.
H5a: The perceived cognition-based trust of a supplier is an antecedent to a customer’s trust 
in it.
H5b: The perceived cognition-based trust of a customer is an antecedent to a supplier’s trust 
in it.
Relationship Between Trustworthiness and Performance
The outcomes of interpersonal and interorganizational trust range from commitment to
safeguards to problems (Blau, 1965; Deutsch, 1958; Noorderhaven, 1992; Swan & Nolan, 1985).
We add supply chain outcomes to the consequences of trust. Consistent with Nyaga, Whipple and
Lynch  (2010),  we  view  trust  as  mediating  the  relationship  between  trustworthiness  and
performance (Dirks & Ferrin, 2001; Jones & George, 1998; Williams, 2001; Ross & LaCroix,
1996).  As  described  by  SET,  trustworthiness  lays  the  foundation  for  social  exchange
relationships (Blau, 1964) between the trustor and trustee that can be critical to performance. It
also  reduces  the  potential  for  opportunistic  behavior  by  a  trustee  through  development  of
intangible transaction-specific assets.
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Thus, we propose that trustworthiness is positively associated with supply chain trust. The
outcome of supply chain trust is the trustor’s willingness to make itself vulnerable to a trustee by
engaging in various types of risk taking behavior (Mayer & Davis, 1999) that can be beneficial to
supply chain performance. This may include cooperation with the trustee, sharing sensitive
information with the trustee and voluntarily allowing the trustee to have control over issues (such
as product quality) and assets (such as equipment or dies) that are important to the trustor (Mayer
& Davis, 1999). These activities, in turn, should be positively related to performance.
H6a: Trust of a customer is associated with a supplier’s order accuracy expectations.
H6b: Trust of a supplier is associated with a customer’s order accuracy expectations.
H7a: Trust of a customer is associated with a supplier’s quality expectations.
H7b: Trust of a supplier is associated with a customer’s quality expectations.
H8a: Trust of a customer is associated with a supplier’s cost expectations.
H8b: Trust of a supplier is associated with a customer’s cost expectations.
H9a: Trust of a customer is associated with a supplier’s on-time delivery expectations.
H9b: Trust of a supplier is associated with a customer’s on-time delivery expectations.
METHOD
This research was conducted in two stages. First, data was collected from customers and
suppliers using a survey to test the proposed hypotheses. Second, a panel of subject matter experts
was convened to discuss the findings, providing richness and contextual understanding to the
results. This helped to ground the results in management practice, as well as reducing the potential
for common method bias.
Sample
The sample was drawn from the logistics service industry in Brazil, which includes
activities related to inventory management, storage, transportation and value-added services. Trust
is especially critical in this industry, as firms outsource more and more important logistics
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activities (Ambrose et al., 2010; Delbufalo, 2012; Ha, Park & Cho, 2011; Nyaga et al., 2010;
Seppänen et al., 2007). One of the authors has more than 15 years of strategic, managerial and
operational experience in this industry, making it possible to probe more deeply into its problems
and  issues.  Data  was  collected  in  two  independent  samples,  one  consisting  of  suppliers  of
logistics services and the other consisting of customers of logistics services. The sample was
randomly  drawn  from  two  trade  association  mailing  lists:  Abralog  (Brazilian  Logistics
Association) and Publicare (the publisher of Tecnologística).
Measures
All items were measured using a 5-point perceptual Likert scale (1=Strongly Disagree,
5=Strongly Agree). Ability is based on Cho’s (2006) competency measure. It contains four items
that ask respondents to assess their perceptions of a major supplier or major customer’s expertise
and  competency.  The  measure  of  benevolence was  taken  from Doney and  Cannon’s (1997)
benevolence measure, for which a reliable and valid Portuguese translation exists (Frederico &
Parente, 2008). It contains three items that ask respondents about the extent to which a major
customer or supplier cares about their wellbeing and supports their goals.  Integrity uses seven
items  from Svensson’s (2001)  honesty  measure  and  Doney and  Cannon’s (1997)  credibility
measure. It asks for respondents’ perceptions of a major supplier or customer’s principles and
fairness.  It  includes  two reverse-coded items.  Trust  was  measured  using  a  single  item from
Doney and Cannon’s (1997) credibility measure that assesses generalized trust.
Performance was measured by four single-item perceptual measures that assess the extent
to which a major supplier or customer meets the respondent firm’s expectations about logistics
service  performance.  They were  developed  based  on  the  commonly  used  measures  of  cost,
quality, dependability and flexibility (Ambrose et al., 2010; Chow, Heaver, & Henriksson, 1994;
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Conceição & Quintão, 2004; Dalstrom, McNeilly, & Speh, 1996; Flynn, Huo, & Zhao, 2010;
Gassenheimer, Sterling, & Robicheaux, 1996; Nyaga et al., 2010; Schoenherr & Swink, 2012;
Terpend, Tyler, Krause, & Handfield, 2008; Villena et al., 2011; Zacharia, Nix, & Lusch, 2011),
adapted to the logistics services context. Order accuracy measures the extent to which an order
was correctly processed, fulfilled and delivered in-full. Quality is the percent of orders delivered
undamaged or in the condition that was expected. Cost assesses the extent to which the cost of
logistics activities was consistent with expectations. On-time delivery is the percentage of orders
delivered on the committed date.
There  were  two  control  variables.  Relationship  duration is  the  length  of  time  of  the
exchange relationship with a major customer or supplier, included because of the potential for
trust to develop over time (Blau, 1965; Cropanzano & Mitchel, 2005) or perceptions of trust to
become more salient over time (Ambrose et al. 2010). Contract size is the annual sales volume
with major customer or supplier. It was included because of the possibility that larger firms may
develop greater trust than smaller firms (Autry & Golicic, 2010).
Questionnaires
There were two separate questionnaires, one where logistics service suppliers were asked
about their trust of customers and one where customers were asked about their trust of logistics
service suppliers. Respondents were instructed to respond with respect to the customer that their
firm supplies the fourth highest volume of logistics service to or supplier that it receives the
fourth highest volume of logistics service from. This was done to avoid external bias, while
facilitating  variability  in  the  responses,  based  on  Anderson  and  Narus’ (1990)  finding  that
relationships with suppliers of the highest or second-highest lines tends to be more uniformly
positive, whereas relationships with the fourth highest are more variable.
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The  supplier  and  customer  questionnaires  contained  mirrored  items.  For  example,  the
supplier item “This customer is genuinely concerned that our business succeeds” is mirrored on
the customer questionnaire as “This supplier is genuinely concerned that our business succeeds.”
The  items  for  the  trustworthiness  measures  were  intermingled  and  randomly  arranged,  to
minimize response bias.
Pretesting
The questionnaire was pre-tested in two phases (Forza, 2002). First, a researcher met with
three managers who were similar to potential respondents, asking whether the instructions and
questions  were  clear,  the  time  to  complete  the  survey  was  adequate  and  whether  they
encountered any unexpected problems. The survey was then completed by a different set of three
logistics professionals to allow performing exploratory assessment of measurement quality and
investigate whether the answers to any questions were concentrated due to the choice of scale or
differed from what was expected.
Data Collection
An electronic message containing the invitation letter and link to survey was sent to 5,759
potential respondents: 2,800 from the Abralog mailing list and 2,959 from Publicare. 1,162 messages
bounced back (20%),  leaving 4,597 valid  email  addresses.  To increase the response rate (Forza,
2002), respondents were invited to attend a panel session that would be held at a local university to
present the results.  A reminder email was sent approximately 15 days after  the initial  invitation.
Potential differences between the first and second waves of survey distribution were checked using t-
tests  and ANOVA (Armstrong & Overton,  1977;  Corsten et  al.,  2011;  Forza,  2002).  The results
showed that the mean values for the constructs were not significantly different. The survey yielded
173 responses (3.8% response rate), of which 83 were logistics service
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customers (48%) and 90 were suppliers (52%). Ten of the customer responses and 15 of the
supplier responses were excluded because of missing data, thus, the final sample consisted of
148 valid responses, of which 73 (50%) were customers and 75 (50%) were suppliers. Table 2
contains a detailed description of the respondents.
Panel Session
An expert panel session was conducted following survey administration and analysis. In
order to include a broad range of managers from the logistics services industry, invitations were
sent to survey respondents and members of the logistics center at the sponsoring university. A
total of 36 logistics managers attended the session. It was facilitated by one of the researchers,
the logistics center coordinator, a member of Abralog, and senior logistics managers from a large
dairy company (a customer) and a large logistics services provider (a supplier). The remaining
participants were managers from logistics services customers, logistics services providers and
consulting companies.
Data Analysis
Measurement  analysis.  The  means,  standard  deviations,  ranges  and  distribution  of  the
variables were analyzed (Forza, 2002), and no outliers or relevant differences were found. The
skew indexes varied from −1.73 to +0.43 and kurtosis indexes varied from -1.34 to 4.36. Both
were  considered  within  acceptable  deviations  from expected  values  (Kline  2005),  therefore,
parametric tests were used for conducting the analysis. Table 3 shows the factor loadings and
Cronbach-α values for each of the scales. The two integrity items that were reversed scaled had
low factor loadings in the three-dimension model and were therefore excluded. Similarly, one
item was  removed  from the  ability  measure  and an  additional  item was  removed  from the
integrity measure, in order to improve their reliability.
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Insert Table 3 about here
Hypothesis testing. The models were tested using multiple regression, with separate models
for  customers  and suppliers.  Models  1  and 2 used trust  as  the dependent  variable,  with the
control variables (relationship length and contract size) and ability, benevolence and integrity as
independent variables. Models 3 and 4 tested the competence-character model with the same
control variables plus competence and character as the independent variables. Similarly, models
5 and 6 tested the affect-cognition model, with the same control variables plus affect-based trust
and competence-based trust as the independent variables. Models 7-10 tested the relationship
between trust and each of the dimensions of performance for customers, while models 11-14 did
the same for suppliers.
RESULTS
Table 4 contains the analysis of the relationship between Mayer et al.’s (1995) dimensions of
trustworthiness and trust for suppliers and customers. Both models were significant at p<.001, with
R2 values of .61 and .83, respectively. Ability (p<.001), benevolence (p<.05) and integrity (p<.05)
were statistically significant for the supplier’s perceptions of customers’ trustworthiness, supporting
H1a and H3a. Ability (p<.01) and benevolence (p<.001) were significant for customers’ perceptions of
suppliers’  trustworthiness,  supporting  H1b and  H2b.  H2a and  H3b were  not  supported.  Thus,  the
analysis revealed differences in the antecedents to trust for suppliers and customers.
Insert Table 4 About Here
Tables 4b and 4c provide the results of the tests of the two alternative models. Each was
statistically significant at p<.001 for both suppliers and customers and had R2 values that were
similar to those in the three-dimension model. While all of the R2 values were relatively high,
they were consistently higher in the customer models, relative to the supplier models.
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Table 4b indicates that both character and competence were statistically significant for
customers (p<.01 and p<.001) and suppliers (p<.001 and p,.01), supporting H4a and H4b. Similarly,
Table 4c indicates that both affect-based trust and cognitive-based trust were significant for
suppliers (p<.001 for both) and customers (p<.001 and p<.01), supporting H5a and H5b. Thus, all
three models of the relationship between trustworthiness and trust were supported. The three-
dimension model was the most informative, however, because it revealed differences in
trustworthiness dimensions between suppliers and customers.
Table 5 contains the results of the analysis of the relationship between trust and performance
for customers and suppliers. It reveals that trust was positively related to expectations about order
accuracy (p<.01 and p<.001), quality (p<.05 and p<.001) and agreed-upon cost (p<.05 and
p<.001), supporting H6 through H8. Trust was also related to on-time delivery expectations
(p<.001) by suppliers, supporting H9a, but not by customers. Thus, H9b was not supported. For
each of the performance models, the R2 value and significance levels were stronger for the
customer models, relative to the supplier models.
Insert Table 5 About Here
The panel of experts agreed with these results and described trust as contingent on the scope,
size and specificity of the contracted service. According to the manager of a large dairy products
company:
In a supply chain redesign project, we had two different scopes: reduce the network
from four CDs to one, which was a low complexity service, and find a new provider
with line feeding experience for a new plant. In the first case, the company opted for
a short  term (2 years)  contract  with more arm´s  length characteristics,  and in the
second case, for a long term contract with a local company because they didn´t trust
that the large, global and cheaper provider had the competence to deliver.
Customers and suppliers may not have the same view and expectation of the services they
are managing. The experts described the Brazilian logistics market as not as mature as the market
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in the U.S. or Europe. This may be due to poorly crafted or off-the-shelf contracts and excessive
informal governance, leading to potential misalignment of expectations. For example, according
to one expert, the procurement area is often responsible for negotiating logistics contracts, with
only a few firms using logistics specialists for this task. As a consequence, contracts often are
off-the-shelf and do not reflect the practical requirements of a logistics operation. At the same
time, small and specialized service providers that claim to be logistics experts offer a broad range
of unrelated services. In such cases, the contract may not contain a clear definition of scope,
service level agreements are not formalized and performance metrics are not defined.
The experts also cautioned that the strength of interpersonal relationships in Brazil can be a
negative, leading to business and personal matters becoming too interwoven, with an excess of
informality. For example, sometimes clients do not understand the necessary bureaucracy and
formalization demanded by a supplier´s compliance processes prior to engaging in a new service,
performance reviews are not in place and responsibilities are not clearly defined. Without such
formalization, a substantial amount of effort is required to manage expectations or accusations
that may arise when problems occur.
DISCUSSION
Key Findings
This  study  contributes  to  understanding  supply  chain  relationships  by  showing  that  the
relationship between supply chain trust and performance may not be applicable to customers and
suppliers in the same manner. More specifically, we found that (i) customers and suppliers have
different  perceptions  of the antecedents  to trust,  (ii)  there are three related,  but  conceptually
independent, antecedents to supply chain trust, and (iii) despite the positive relationship between
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trust  and performance,  customers´  perceptions  of trust  of a supplier  has a greater  impact  on
performance than suppliers´ trust of a customer.
The theoretical  foundations  of this  research provide an explanation for these differences.
TCE  suggests  that  opportunism,  bounded  rationality  and  environmental  uncertainty  impact
measurement and monitoring costs. A firm may either limit resources for measuring performance
and rely on more informal governance based on relational trust and where communication plays
an important role, or spend resources to create more complex governance mechanisms (Poppo &
Zenger, 2002; Rindfleisch & Heide, 1997). SET suggests that environmental and cultural issues
may lead to different perceptions of relationships (Delbufalo, 2012; Mullen, 1995; Villena et al.,
2011).
While all three models of trust antecedents (Mayer, et al., 1995; Gabarro, 1978; McAllister,
1995) were significant, Mayer, et al.’s (1995) three-dimension model provided the most useful
results, showing the importance of different antecedents to trust for suppliers and customers. In
line with previous literature (Ambrose et al., 2010; Barnes, Naude & Mitchell, 2007; Johnston,
McCutcheon, Stuart & Kerwood, 2004; Nyaga et al., 2010; Svensson, 2001; Whipple & Frankel,
2000),  results  indicate  that  customers  and suppliers  may  have  different  perceptions  of  their
relationships. This was not unexpected, since trust is a subjective construct based on expectations
and  outcomes  (Anderson  &Narus,  1990;  Blau,  1965;  Swan  & Nolan,  1985).  For  suppliers,
customer ability and integrity are important in winning trust.  Trusted customers have a good
understanding of what needs to be done, which translates into clear instructions for the logistics
service  provider. In  terms  of  integrity,  trusted  customers  keep  the  logistics  service  provider
informed about any problems that are encountered, provide relevant information and keep their
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promises.  The  extent  to  which  customers  care  about  the  interests  of  the  logistics  service
providers (benevolence) was not important in establishing their trust.
On the other hand, ability and benevolence were important to customers in establishing trust
in  logistics  service  providers.  Their  competence  and  proficiency  in  storing  or  shipping
customers’ goods is an important antecedent to customers’ trust. Benevolence is also important;
customers value logistics service providers that operate with their best interests in mind. The
extent  to  which  logistics  service  providers  provide  information,  inform  customers  about
problems and keep promises (integrity) was not important in establishing their trust.
Our findings are consistent with Colquitt et al.’s (2007) meta-analysis:
Our results support the importance of all three trustworthiness dimensions, as all
three had significant, unique relationships with trust (Colquitt, et al., 2017, p. 917-
918).
This is especially interesting because of the differences between our research design and Colquitt, et
al.’s (2007). Our research was set in the logistics service industry, while Colquitt, et al.’s (2007) study
was  a  meta-analysis  of  research  in  many  industries,  including  both  manufacturing  and  service
industries. The research analyzed by Colquitt et al. (2007) was at the individual level of analysis,
using  co-workers  and  team leaders  as  the  referent  for  trustworthiness.  Our  research  was  at  the
interorganizational level of analysis, examining the antecedents of trust between firms in a supply
chain. Thus, our research demonstrates that Mayer, et al.’s (1995) dimensions of trustworthiness are
robust across levels of analysis. In addition, the research analyzed by Colquitt, et al. (2007) used
behavioral  performance  measures,  including  risk-taking  behaviors,  citizenship  behavior  and
counterproductive  work  behaviors,  as  well  as  perceptions  of  task  performance.  In  contrast,  our
performance measures were perceptual measures of the extent to which order
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accuracy,  quality,  cost  and  on-time  delivery  expectations  had  been  met.  Thus,  the  three-
dimension perspective of trustworthiness is robust across performance measures.
Contributions
This research makes several important contributions to the literature on supply chain trust.
First, it distinguishes between trustworthiness and trust in a supply chain. While establishment of
trust is important in a supply chain, understanding the dimensions of trustworthiness provides
managers with stepping stone for improving their firms’ trustworthiness and hence contribute to
developing trust with a customer or supplier. Second, it articulates three conceptually distinct
dimensions of trustworthiness, building on both the seminal research by Mayer, et al. (1995) and
Colquitt  et  al.’s (2007) meta-analysis  of a substantial  amount  of research on individual  level
trust. Third, it finds that customers and suppliers differ in the dimensions of trustworthiness that
are important to them in developing trust with exchange partners in a supply chain. Fourth, it
shows that Mayer et al.’s (1995) three dimensions of trustworthiness are enduring, robust across
contexts, levels of analysis and performance measures.
This research also studied specific outcomes that supply chain trust can predict. We found
that supply chain trust is important to the standard measures of logistics service performance and
that it is important to both supply chain suppliers and customers. Thus, supply chain trust is an
important construct in supply chain research, benefitting both upstream and downstream supply
chain members.
The  specific  context  of  this  research  was  an  emerging  country  with  high  environmental
uncertainty and low interpersonal trust (ASEP/JDS, 2014; Confederação Nacional da Indústria - CNI,
2014).  In  such  an  environment,  firms  may  be  more  likely  to  rely  on  informal  governance,  use
inadequate assessment instruments, and have ineffective communication mechanisms, leading to
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the perceptual  gap identified  in the research.  The panel  of  experts  supported this  possibility
because the logistics market  in Brazil  is  not mature and is characterized by an immediatism
culture and strong interpersonal relationships.
Managerial Implications
The findings from this research offer important implications for managers in supply chains.
They show the practical benefit of fostering trust in a supply chain, linking it to expectations
about supply chain performance. We found that perceptions of trustworthiness of a supply chain
partner were different for customers and suppliers. By differentiating trust from trustworthiness,
this  research  provides  a  practical  guide  for  increasing  trustworthiness  for  customers  and
suppliers. Managers should recognize that perceptions of their relationships are different. In an
environment  with  high  uncertainty,  opportunistic  behavior,  an  immediatism  culture  and
operational stress, such as Brazil´s, they should be more aware of the potential negative impact
of governance based on excessive relational aspects. In this case, focusing communication efforts
to align expectations and perceptions should help to improve logistics performance.
Limitations
Although the focus on both supplier and customer perceptions of trust and trustworthiness
is a contribution of this research,  it  is important to remember that the supplier and customer
samples were independent of each other. Focusing on dyads of suppliers and their customers will
make an important contribution to future research on supply chain trust. In addition, single item
measures  were used for trust  and the performance measures.  Although we would argue that
single item performance measures  are clearer  to understand and interpret  than measures that
aggregate different types of performance, we encourage future researchers to develop multiple
item measures for each of these constructs.
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Opportunities for Future Research
The arguments presented above may reflect power and dependence, which are relationship
characteristics that can influence customer-supplier relationships. Oosterhuis, Molleman and Van
Der Vaart (2013) argued that more powerful firms tend to be more focused on themselves and
pay less attention to other firms. In asymmetric interfirm transactional relationships, actions that
aim to foster trust appear to be a calculative strategy developed only by the more dependent
partners to limit transactional risk (Donada & Nogatchewsky, 2006). This may be applicable to
the sample used in this study, since 68% of customers classified their partner as a transportation
company,  a  commoditized  segment  where  suppliers  are  more  dependent  on  the  customer.
Therefore, it would be interesting to extend this model to relationships where the supplier has
greater power and is less dependent than the customer.
This research makes the argument that the long tradition in of trust research organizational
behavior and marketing research provides a good foundation for research on supply chain trust.
However, to date, the domain of most supply chain trust research has been limited to the existing
supply  chain  literature  on  trust.  We  encourage  future  researchers  to  do  a  comprehensive
systematic literature review on trust that draws upon supply chain management, organizational
behavior, marketing and perhaps other domains to refine the supply chain trust construct.
There is substantial opportunity to make a contribution to the literature on supply chain trust
through  the  study  of  dyads  of  suppliers  and  customers  that  have  a  supply  chain  relationship.
Although collecting this type of data is very challenging, it has the potential to contribute insightful
findings that could not be obtained through other types of research. Further, future research could
complement survey research with qualitative case studies based on dyads or a supply chain
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network, enabling involvement of respondents from multiple levels in combination with other
sources of data.
CONCLUSIONS
This  research  empirically  shows  how  customers´  and  suppliers´  perspectives  of  trust  and
performance differ, and that the relationship between trust and performance may not be perceived by
customers and suppliers in the same manner. Discussions with experts indicate that these findings
may be due to environmental and cultural issues specific to the context of this research.
Confirming the findings of previous literature, we found that there is a positive relationship
between supply chain trust and performance, but also that customers´ trust of a supplier was more
strongly related to performance than suppliers´ trust of a customer. Although this seems reasonable
since it is the customer who selects the supplier, additional possible reasons were identified in this
research. One is related to the scope, size and specificity of the service provided because customers
may  deliberately  differentiate  between  a  closer  and  strategic  supplier  vs.  a  more  arm´s  length
relationship,  and  therefore,  the  levels  of  trust  will  be  different.  This  may  reflect  power  and
dependence, since more powerful firms tend to be more focused on themselves, and more dependent
firms tend to employ a calculative strategy to limit their transactional risk.
This  research  has  only  scratched  the  surface  of  supply  chain  trust.  There  are  many
opportunities to further develop this important construct and explore its relationships with other
important supply chain factors and outcomes.
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Ambrose, et al., 2010 Matched dyads ● ●
Corsten, et al., 2011 Suppliers ● ●
Donney& Cannon, 1997 Customers ● ●
Ganesan, 1994 Matched dyads ● ●
Gulati & Nickerson, 2008 Customers ● ●
Ha, et al., 2011 Suppliers ● ● ●
Johnston, et al., 2004 Matched dyads ● ●
Kwon & Suh, 2004 Independent samples ● ●
Lado,et al., 2008 Customers ● ●
Liu, et al., 2009 Matched dyads ● ●
Mellewigt, et al., 2007 Customers ● ●
Nyaga, et al., 2010 Independent samples ● ●
Poppo, et al., 2008 Customers ● ● ●
Svensson, 2001 Independent samples ● ● ● ●
Tian, et al., 2008 Customers ● ● ●
Whipple & Frankel, 2000 Matched dyads ● ●






Less than 2 years 13% 17%
2 to 5 years 38% 25%
5 to 10 years 23% 24%





Less than R$1 million 36% 16%
R$1 to 3 million 30% 29%
R$3 to 10 million 21% 16%





Measure Items Cronbach’s Alpha Eigenvalue Factor Loadings
Buyers Suppliers Buyers Suppliers Buyers Suppliers
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COM1
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Table 4a: Three-Dimension Model (Mayer, et al., 1995)
Suppliers’ Trust of Customers Customers’ Trust of Suppliers
ß Sig. ß Sig.
Constant -.61 .233 .28 .369
Relationship Duration .07 .259 -.04 .348
Contract Size .02 .698 -.02 .630
Ability .48 .000 .33 .002
Benevolence .25 .028 .66 .000
Integrity .37 .000 .05 .652
F=21.41 p<.000  R2=.61 F=64.72 p<.000   R2=.83
Table 4b: Affect-Based and Cognition-Based Trust (McAllister, 1995)
Suppliers’ Trust of Customers Customers’ Trust of Suppliers
ß Sig. ß Sig.
Constant -.30 .557 .20 .525
Relationship Duration .05 .488 -.03 .522
Contract Size .01 .843 -.02 .505
Affect-Based Trust .33 .002 .72 .000
Cognition-Based Trust .75 .000 .34 .003
F=24.12 p<.000   R2=.58 F=74.78  p<.000 R2=.82
Table 4c: Character and Competence (Gabarro, 1978)
Suppliers’ Trust of Customers Customers’ Trust of Suppliers
ß Sig. ß Sig.
Constant -.57 .258 -.10 .758
Relationship Duration .07 .272 -.03 .603
Contract Size .02 .732 -.02 .490
Character .61 .000 .73 .000
Competence .51 .000 .33 .004
F=27.01 p<.000   R2=.61 F=67.65  p<.000 R2=.80
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TABLE 5
Relationship between Trust and Supply Chain Performance
Table 5a: Order Accuracy Expectations
Suppliers’ Trust of Customers Customers’ Trust of Suppliers
ß Sig. ß Sig.
Constant 3.61 .000 1.87 .000
Relationship Duration .10 .129 .07 .298
Contract Size -.08 .078 -.05 .315
Trust .21 .008 .52 .000
F=4.00   p<.015   R2 =.15 F=18.32 p<.000 R2=.44
Table 5b: Quality Expectations
Suppliers’ Trust of Customers Customers’ Trust of Suppliers
ß Sig. ß Sig.
Constant 3.43 .000 3.01 .000
Relationship Duration .14 .060 .02 .737
Contract Size -.08 .086 -.02 .710
Trust .20 .021 .31 .000
F=3.72   p<.015   R2 =.14 F=7.43 p<.000 R2=.424
Table 5c: Cost Expectations
Suppliers’ Trust of Customers Customers’ Trust of Suppliers
ß Sig. ß Sig.
Constant 3.63 .000 2.52 .000
Relationship Duration .13 .079 -.01 .909
Contract Size -.11 .028 -.03 .562
Trust .21 .014 .46 .000
F=4.30   p<.008   R2 =.15 F=15.01 p<.000 R2=.40
Table 5d: On-Time Delivery Expectations
Suppliers’ Trust of Customers Customers’ Trust of Suppliers
ß Sig. ß Sig.
Constant 3.93 .000 2.59 .000
Relationship Duration .04 .515 -.01 .935
Contract Size -.04 .435 .04 .391
Trust .15 .069 .37 .000
F=1.43  p<.241 R2=.06 F=7.53 p<.000 R2=.25
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